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# Electricity in Kentucky: A Primer
- URL: https://www.bluegrassinstitute.org/electricity-in-kentucky-a-primer/
- Published: 2026-11-17T13:00:00.000Z
- Updated: 2026-11-17T13:00:02.000Z
- Description: Policymakers need an independent understanding of how the electrical system works before deciding how it should change. This paper is the first in a Bluegrass Institute series designed to provide it.
- Author: Joseph Verruni
- Tags: Economic Competitiveness, Policy Brief, Research

## Executive Summary

Electricity is fundamental to Kentucky’s economy, but the system that produces, moves, regulates, and prices it is extraordinarily complex. There is no single “Kentucky grid,” no single regulator, and no single market. Yet decisions about this system will shape what Kentuckians pay for electricity, the reliability of their power, and the commonwealth’s ability to compete for investment and jobs.

Policymakers need an independent understanding of how that system works before deciding how it should change. This paper is the first in a Bluegrass Institute series designed to provide it. It describes Kentucky’s electricity system accurately and neutrally: who owns it, who regulates it, how its pieces fit together, and where the important pressure points lie. 

[Electricity in Kentucky: A Primer20261117 Electricity in Kentucky.pdf508 KBdownload-circle](https://www.bluegrassinstitute.org/content/files/2026/11/20261117-Electricity-in-Kentucky.pdf "Download")

The Bluegrass Institute is a free-market think tank. A separate paper will make the case for specific reforms. This one starts with the facts.

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## I. There is no single "Kentucky grid."

**Electricity in Kentucky does not function as one system.** Nothing about the current arrangement was designed from scratch. It is the result of separate business decisions and political settlements made between 1900 and the 1970s, with later additions like territorial boundary rules in 1972 and the EPIC retirement-review layer in 2024.

**“The grid” is a patchwork of three kinds of utilities, two RTOs, four regional grid operators, two main regulators, and a federal overlay, built up in distinct waves over more than a century.** Each wave left its own ownership form, financing model, and political constituency in place.

## II. Who provides Kentucky’s electricity?

In Kentucky, an electric utility can be any of three very different things.

### Investor-owned utilities (IOUs). 

The electrical grid originated with for-profit private ventures. **Today, most Kentuckians get their electricity from IOUs.** They are:

- Louisville Gas and Electric (LG&E) is absorbing Kentucky Utilities (KU). A merger was [approved by regulators in September 2026](https://psc.ky.gov/Case/ViewCaseFilings/2026-00077?ref=bluegrassinstitute.org). LG&E will continue to do business under KU branding in that service territory. This new entity will serve over 41% of Kentucky ratepayers.
- Kentucky Power, a subsidiary of American Electric Power, serves eastern Kentucky.
- Duke Energy Kentucky serves the Cincinnati-area suburbs in northern Kentucky.

### Rural electric cooperatives. 

When for-profit companies found low population density made rural investment uneconomic, the New Deal stepped in. The Rural Electrification Administration offered low-cost federal loans to farmer-owned cooperatives to build power lines. There are two types of cooperatives in Kentucky: generation and transmission cooperatives, which generate electricity and transmit it to their member co-ops, and distribution cooperatives–those members–which deliver it to their retail customers.

Kentucky has two Generation and Transmission (G&T) cooperatives that are owned by and provide power to their member distribution cooperatives–a co-op of co-ops. The distribution co-ops built this second layer to supply their own wholesale power rather than buy it from the IOUs. They are:

| G&T Cooperative                        | Member Distribution Cooperatives                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    |
| -------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| Big Rivers Electric Corporation        | Jackson Purchase Energy Cooperative; Kenergy Corp; Meade County Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              |
| East Kentucky Power Cooperative (EKPC) | Big Sandy RECC; Blue Grass Energy Cooperative; Clark Energy Cooperative; Cumberland Valley Electric; Farmers RECC; Fleming-Mason Energy Cooperative; Grayson RECC; Inter-County Energy; Jackson Energy Cooperative; Licking Valley RECC; Nolin RECC; Owen Electric Cooperative; Salt River Electric Cooperative; Shelby Energy Cooperative; South Kentucky RECC; Taylor County RECC |

These G&T Cooperatives and their member cooperatives are subject to regulation by the Kentucky Public Service Commission. Prior to the creation of G&Ts, rural coops purchased power from the IOUs. 

> **Federal Overlay: Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA)**

> TVA is a federally owned corporation created in 1933\. It serves only a few Kentucky retail customers directly–though they are very large industrial consumers; it mostly owns and operates power plants. However, it supplies nearly 20% of Kentucky’s land area through local power companies. TVA operates under its own federal enabling statute (its rates are set by its board of Senate-confirmed presidential appointees), outside the state regulatory system that governs the other three categories.

> Five rural electric distribution cooperatives receive their power from the TVA: West Kentucky Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation, Pennyrile Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation, Tri-County Electric Membership Corporation, Warren Rural Electric Cooperative Corporation, Gibson Electric Membership Corporation. Ten Kentucky municipalities also receive power from the TVA, including Bowling Green and Hopkinsville.

> **Today, roughly two dozen distribution cooperatives deliver electricity to more than 1.5 million Kentuckians across 117 counties, or 71% of the state's landmass.** All co-ops are member-owned and not-for-profit; their boards are elected by their customers. 

### Municipal utilities. 

**A smaller but politically significant set of Kentucky cities own and operate their own electric distribution systems.** Owensboro Municipal Utilities, Paducah Power System, Frankfort Plant Board, and several smaller systems sit outside state retail rate jurisdiction. They are governed by local boards rather than the Public Service Commission. They mostly buy wholesale through a patchwork of contracts and joint-action agencies, though a few have their own limited generation.

## III. Who makes the regulatory decisions?

### The Public Service Commission

The Kentucky Public Service Commission (PSC) is the principal state utility regulator. It was created by the Kentucky legislature and is governed by the laws the legislature passes. Five commissioners are appointed by the governor and confirmed by the Kentucky Senate. **The PSC's core functions are:**

- **Rate regulation.** The PSC reviews and approves utility rate cases–when a utility asks to change what it charges customers–through a quasi-judicial process.
- **Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity (CPCN).** Before building a new power plant, transmission line, or other major facility, a regulated utility must prove to the PSC that the project is needed and will not duplicate existing facilities.
- **Safety and reliability oversight.** Outage investigations, pipeline and gas safety inspections, and service-quality standards.

The PSC does not regulate rates for municipal utilities, which are governed by their city governments, and electric utilities within the TVA service area, which are governed by federal law.

**Legislation that purports to "reform Kentucky utilities" but reaches only PSC-regulated entities leaves a meaningful share–around 20%–of the state's electricity consumed untouched due to their either being in TVA or municipal service areas.**

### Energy Planning and Inventory Commission

**The Energy Planning and Inventory Commission (EPIC) was created in 2024 and is not a traditional utility regulator.** While administratively attached to the University of Kentucky Center for Applied Energy Research, it is independent of both the university and any executive branch agency. **EPIC’s core functions are:**

- **Retirement review.** A utility attempting to retire a fossil-fuel-fired generating unit must file an application with the PSC and carry the burden of overcoming a presumption against retirement. EPIC holds a public hearing and then issues written findings. The PSC will not treat the retirement application as complete without those reports unless more than 180 days have passed. A utility also cannot base its retirement decision on federal financial incentives, such as renewable tax credits or coal remediation grants.
- **Replacement capacity review.** Proposed replacement generation must deliver as much power, contribute as much toward peak demand, keep the grid as reliable, and leave the utility with the capacity cushion its grid operator requires. Replacement units must be dispatchable and not intermittent, meaning solar and wind cannot be used, even when paired with batteries.

**The practical effect is to slow coal and gas retirements**, though the source of that effect is the 2023 and 2024 statutes rather than EPIC itself, which reviews and reports but does not decide. Supporters argue the framework prevents ratepayers from subsidizing utility sustainability commitments and protects in-state coal jobs and reliability. Critics argue it shields incumbent generation from market and regulatory pressure that would otherwise drive faster retirement. Retirements have still been approved but they now run a longer and more demanding gauntlet than before.

### Regional transmission organizations and balancing authorities

Two regional transmission organizations (RTOs) operate in parts of Kentucky:

| RTO                 | Kentucky member utilities                                                                                             | Member states                                                                                                                                                               |
| ------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| PJM Interconnection | Kentucky Power; Duke Energy Kentucky; East Kentucky Power Cooperative (on behalf of its 16 distribution cooperatives) | Delaware; Illinois; Indiana; Kentucky; Maryland; Michigan; New Jersey; North Carolina; Ohio; Pennsylvania; Tennessee; Virginia; West Virginia; District of Columbia         |
| MISO                | Big Rivers Electric Corporation (on behalf of its 3 distribution cooperatives); Henderson Municipal Power & Light     | Arkansas; Illinois; Indiana; Iowa; Kentucky; Louisiana; Michigan; Minnesota; Mississippi; Missouri; Montana; North Dakota; South Dakota; Texas; Wisconsin; Manitoba, Canada |

**RTOs operate as:**

- **Wholesale markets.** Each RTO runs centralized wholesale markets for its footprint: generators and utilities inside it bid into a common market rather than buying and selling only within their own state or their own system. Duke Energy Kentucky’s East Bend plant in Boone County competes in the same market as generators in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and the utility can buy from that market rather than only from its own fleet.
- **Balancing authority.** RTOs also act as the balancing authority within their jurisdictions. [Per the U.S. Energy Department](https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/files/2023-08/Balancing%20Authority%20Backgrounder%5F2022-Formatted%5F041723%5F508.pdf?ref=bluegrassinstitute.org): “A balancing authority ensures that power system demand and supply are always balanced, which maintains safe and reliable operation of the power system. If supply falls below demand, it can cause a drop in frequency below the stable system frequency, risking significant permanent physical damage to electrical equipment and prolonged grid-wide blackouts. During such situations, balancing authorities may direct utilities to “shed load” (i.e., implement rolling blackouts) to bring supply and demand into balance.”

LG&E/KU and TVA both act as their own balancing authorities, with LG&E/KU taking reliability direction from the TVA.

The tradeoff of being in an RTO is administrative: interconnection queues have become congested, and a project can wait years to connect. Outside an RTO, the problem inverts. Little independent generation seeks to connect to LG&E/KU’s system, because the incumbent utility is effectively the only wholesale buyer in its territory. 

### Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

**The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) sits above the PSC.** Five commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate govern wholesale power sales and transmission in interstate commerce, while retail rates stay with the states. **FERC’s core functions are:**

- **Wholesale rates and interstate transmission.** The rates, terms, and conditions of wholesale sales from one utility to another and for moving power across another company’s high-voltage lines. A utility cannot change them without FERC approval. Co-op G&T’s and TVA are outside this authority, with the exception of EKPC and Big Rivers, who are accountable to PJM and MISO.
- **Open access.** Transmission-owning utilities must let others use their wires on the same terms they give themselves, for a posted fee, as long as there is available capacity. This allows co-ops and municipals to buy power from distant suppliers and have it delivered over the IOU's wires–the retail monopoly is otherwise left intact.
- **Transmission planning.** FERC orders have required standardization of how available capacity is calculated and requires open, coordinated transmission planning at the local and regional levels, in addition to requiring coordination among neighboring regions on solutions to shared needs. The reasoning is that a utility building only for its own footprint builds more transmission than it needs and bills customers for the difference.

## IV. How does the market work?

The dominant view among economists and policymakers throughout the 20th century, and one still widely held today, is that electricity delivery is a textbook natural monopoly: because building duplicate sets of poles, wires, and substations to serve the same customers would be wastefully expensive, a single regulated distribution system is assumed to deliver lower costs than competing firms could. 

Monopolies, including utilities, are considered by those who advocate for markets to have an economic incentive to overcharge and underperform–without a competitor able to undercut them on price or service, nothing forces discipline. That's why states regulate both the price and quality of service for electric utilities. In Kentucky, that job falls to the Public Service Commission for IOUs and most cooperatives, to city governments for municipal utilities, and to TVA’s own contracts for the cooperatives and municipals that resell its power.

A “rate” is the price of a unit of electricity, and a “ratepayer” is an electricity customer. Rates are regulated by the PSC, based on operating costs (including depreciation and taxes) and a return on invested capital. All IOU profit comes through invested capital, [giving utilities the financial interest](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Averch%E2%80%93Johnson%5Feffect?ref=bluegrassinstitute.org) in capital-intensive solutions over cheaper alternatives that earn no return. The PSC decides what is “used and useful” and “prudent” investment.

Ordinary businesses operate on supply and demand, attempting to attract customers with lower prices and/or better services, with customers deciding between firms, leading to changing corporate behavior to meet consumer preferences and hold businesses accountable. In Kentucky, consumers have no such choice; the utility proposes and the PSC approves what customers will get.

## V. Where is the market?

### Kentucky customers cannot shop for their electricity supplier.

Kentucky is a fully vertically integrated–generation, transmission and retail sales are all handled by the same company–cost-of-service (retail prices) regulated state. 

The utility that owns the distribution wires also owns most or all of the local transmission and generation, plans the system, and bills the customer. **Consumer choice comes exclusively in the form of deciding where to locate; shopping for supply is not possible.** Texas, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and roughly a dozen other states give consumers the ability to shop for their provider–this is not the case in the commonwealth.

What customers can do is limited:

- Net metering is permitted for small-scale renewable generation (solar, wind, hydro, biomass, biogas) up to 45 kilowatts (roughly a very small commercial rooftop solar array). Each utility's obligation to interconnect eligible small generators is capped at 1% of its peak single-hour load from the prior year.
- Special contracts and economic development riders allow large customers (typically industrial) to negotiate custom rate arrangements with their utility, subject to PSC approval. Much of the current data center policy debate concerns whether and how to expand or modify these arrangements.

**Lack of customer choice is the single most important consumer-facing fact about Kentucky electricity**, and it is the fact most often misunderstood by reformers from competition states.

### Most Kentucky electricity still comes from coal.

In 2024, **coal provided 75% of the electricity consumed in the Commonwealth, while natural gas accounted for another 23%**. Of electricity produced in-state, 67% came from coal and 26% from natural gas. **While renewable energy production is currently marginal, it is growing**: in June 2026, solar produced almost as much electricity as hydroelectric, temporarily (solar output is higher in the summer) boosting renewables’ share of total in-state electricity production to around 6%.

Kentucky has no commercial wind generation, and potential is low. Three large utility-scale solar farms (totaling 610 MW) came online as of 2025, boosting its share of power production upwards of 2%.

## VI. What’s at Stake?

### Kentucky’s cheap electricity is an economic competitive advantage

Kentucky electricity is cheap by national standards–and currently growing at a slower rate than most of its neighbors. In 2024, the state had the **12th-lowest average electricity price in the country and the lowest east of the Mississippi River**. Kentucky sits upon vast coal deposits that have historically been used to cheaply fuel power plants.

![](https://storage.ghost.io/c/53/d3/53d3d9df-ebeb-488c-bde8-096c9490d2d8/content/images/2026/11/table-1.png)

However, the cost gap among the lowest-cost states is narrowing: aging coal plants are becoming more expensive to operate due to high maintenance and compliance costs, replacement gas and renewable generation carries higher capital costs, and recent rate cases have produced meaningful increases. Transmission and infrastructure hardening and replacement due to weather has also been passed on to ratepayers.

**When rates are visibly low, demands for structural reform are small, and this has insulated Kentucky’s regulatory regime.** Rising rates may be changing that calculus. Even if rates are climbing at a rate lower than neighboring states, Kentuckians still feel the pinch. The PSC has pushed back on some requests from utilities to raise rates, helping slow the growth, but the growth is still there.

Affordable and abundant energy makes Kentucky attractive to energy-intensive businesses and helps with cost-of-living. Electricity is an input to almost everything, and increasing electricity costs reverberate throughout the entire economy. More than half of Kentucky homes are heated using electricity, making electricity price increases hit harder.

### Pressure Points.

Several developments are reshaping the political environment in Frankfort.

**Kentucky’s currently-low electricity costs, favorable tax incentives, and plentiful water resources are attractive to potential hyperscale data centers.** The speed-to-market required for these facilities is running up against the reality of existing regulations and interconnection queues. They are power-hungry operations and are forcing utilities to revise their resource plans upward, raising hard questions about how the cost of new generation and planning risks gets allocated between data center customers and everyone else, resulting in political friction across the country. In other states there is [increasing evidence that data centers drive down rates](https://www.bluegrassinstitute.org/jv-data-center-data/)–Kentucky is not yet home to any hyperscale data centers. Over 90% of Kentucky electricity customers are served by utilities that have a large load or data center-specific tariff on the books, helping create some insulation for current customers. These ratepayer protections are not the same thing as cost-causation–making large-load customers pay for the costs they impose on the system–but they help act as insurance.

**Whether policies designed to slow coal retirements succeed depends on factors largely outside Frankfort’s control**: fuel costs, capital costs, federal environmental rules, technological innovation in generation, customer demand and wholesale market economics.

**The economics of nuclear energy remain unfavorable**, but new legislation and innovative small modular reactors are attempting to change that math. Nuclear is a longer-term consideration and new nuclear plants have not yet proven cost-effective, in spite of their promise of environmentally-friendly, reliable energy. Just prior to publication, [The Nuclear Company announced intentions to build the largest nuclear plant in the country in Lewis County](https://www.thenuclearcompany.com/posts/the-nuclear-company-announces-prosperity-one?ref=bluegrassinstitute.org)–it is still in the extremely early stages, and construction will start no earlier than 2028.

## VII. What can Frankfort actually control?

The Public Service Commission was created by the legislature and its proceedings are intended to implement the regulatory preferences of lawmakers. The governor can appoint its members who decide on those proceedings, and the Senate can choose to confirm or reject those appointees. Lawmakers can pass laws to give the PSC tools to change the outcomes of those proceedings. They can and have added other regulatory layers, such as EPIC.

There are other mechanisms outside of electricity policy that can be levers. In August 2026, [Governor Beshear issued an executive order pertaining to data centers](https://governor.ky.gov/attachments/20260806%5FExecutive-Order%5F2026-494%5FRelated-to-Data-Centers.pdf?ref=bluegrassinstitute.org), and within it the Governor threatened to use his environmental regulation enforcement powers to block data center development in an attempt to protect ratepayers.

Kentucky lawmakers have avoided implementing expensive environmental laws such as a renewable portfolio standard, tax incentives for renewable energy, or carbon pricing. While environmental concerns can be important, legislation addressing them almost always comes with the tradeoff of increased rates.

## VIII. How we got here

### Three regional waves of history explain why the Kentucky grid looks as it does.

**It is helpful to remember Kentucky’s electrification was a process, with private companies electrifying the highest-population areas and locales with greater economic activity (like coal mines) first, with some smaller cities creating their own municipal utilities, and then the federal government connecting the dots by supporting rural electrification.** By the 1970s, Kentucky's distribution system had reached nearly every part of the Commonwealth, and 1972 legislation then froze retail service territories into place. These territorial boundary laws restricted service within a geographic area to the incumbent utility.

[Electricity in Kentucky: A Primer20261117 Electricity in Kentucky.pdf508 KBdownload-circle](https://www.bluegrassinstitute.org/content/files/2026/11/20261117-Electricity-in-Kentucky-1.pdf "Download")

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*Acknowledgements: I would like to thank my reviewers for the generous insight and support that helped to greatly improve this product, including* [*Angela Erickson*](https://www.bluegrassinstitute.org/author/angela-erickson/) *and Lighthouse Energy Institute’s* [*Kent Chandler*](https://lighthouseenergyinstitute.org/people/staff/kent-chandler/?ref=bluegrassinstitute.org)*.*